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AbstrAct
The growth of mobile devices with near PC equivalent capabilities has brought with it the possibility 
of mobile Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems. However, the unique nature of mobile devices introduces new 
challenges that need to be considered during the development process, especially when considering 
critical aspects such as system security. This chapter presents the PEPERS Development Methodology 
(PDM), a tool-supported methodology that aims to assist designers in developing secure mobile P2P 
systems, and encourages them to consider specific mobile P2P design issues from an early stage. The 
PDM is demonstrated within the context of a real-world case study of a system developed for a security 
company.
INtrODUctION
The rapid growth in availability of mobile devices 
with ever increasing functionality has brought 
with it the possibility of mobile Peer-to-Peer (P2P) 
systems. More recently, advances in wireless 
networking and mobile computing technologies, 
such as wireless LANs, wireless mesh networks 
and 3G cellular networks have further facilitated 
the migration of the P2P paradigm into wireless 
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mobile computing. The combination of mobile and 
P2P technologies could be ideal for organisations 
that possess characteristics such as, decentralised 
management styles, geographically dispersed or 
highly mobile workforces, a wide range of com-
puting and communications devices, etc.
However in developing real-world mobile P2P 
systems, designers can face a new set of develop-
ment challenges - particularly when it comes to 
providing security and privacy. Ensuring such 
characteristics exist within a system is of particular 
importance in an environment that, by its very 
nature, is ad-hoc and heterogeneous. 
The issue is complicated, however, by the fact 
that the P2P approaches used and the underlying 
mobile technologies will also have an impact on a 
system’s characteristics (Walkerdine, 2001). For 
example, the choice of P2P topology can signifi-
cantly impact on how well a system can provide 
security. Decentralised P2P systems are likely 
to be better suited for handling denial of service 
attacks; the central authority provided by semi-
centralised P2P systems would be better suited 
for handling authentication. Likewise the resource 
constraints (e.g. memory, battery life) of mobile 
devices can limit the amount of computation that 
can be performed or the level of communication 
between devices.
Such issues are important, and necessary to 
consider when developing a secure mobile P2P 
system. Having a development method to ac-
commodate them is vital but, unfortunately, is 
something which is currently lacking within the 
domain.  This chapter presents the PEPERS De-
velopment Methodology (PDM), a tool-supported 
methodology that provides such development 
assistance. The PDM encourages designers to 
consider the issues that are central to mobile 
P2P system development (for example, identify-
ing security concerns, considering mobility and 
technical constraints, and making architectural 
design decisions) from an early stage. It supports 
the designer throughout the development cycle, 
from initial requirements elicitation through to 
the final implementation - ensuring that security 
and mobile concerns are properly addressed 
throughout. In particular, it assists developers 
in determining the most suitable P2P topologies 
and application reference architectures for their 
design, based on the system, security and mobility 
requirements that they have identified. The PDM 
comes with tool support and this is also illustrated 
within this chapter.  
The PDM was developed as part of the EU 
funded PEPERS (PEPERS, 2006) project that 
has developed an infrastructure to support the 
design, development and operational deployment 
of secure mobile P2P applications. The outcomes 
of the project have been utilised and evaluated by 
industrial user partners within their own business 
domains, as well as a number of mobile software 
development companies. In order to help illustrate 
the use of the PDM and support tool, a real-life 
case study is provided that involves one of these 
industrial systems.
This chapter begins by discussing some of 
the key issues that need to be considered when 
developing a secure mobile P2P system. An over-
view of the PDM is then provided, along with a 
description of the case study and developed tool 
support. The PDM is then described in detail, 
referring to the case study to demonstrate each 
stage in use. 
bAcKGrOUND
Although in general developers can draw upon 
existing software engineering techniques for 
developing secure mobile P2P systems, the dis-
tributed and unpredictable nature of P2P coupled 
with the technical challenges of mobile technol-
ogy and security constraints, means that there 
are a number of specific issues that designers 
must consider.
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Making security central to the 
Design
Successful security functionality is not something 
that can be bolted onto a system as an afterthought. 
The broad nature of security means that it is 
something that should be considered at all stages 
of a systems development. For example, technical 
and company policy issues can have an impact on 
proposed security requirements; the choice of P2P 
topology can impact on how these requirements 
are met; the 3rd party encryption component 
that is to be used can likewise have an impact, 
etc. It is therefore important to make security 
a central concern throughout the development 
lifecycle. Such activities can also be supported 
from an organisational perspective by adopting 
a rigid review process, and assigning members 
of the development team specific roles to ensure 
that security requirements are being properly 
considered. 
Mobility requirements and 
constraints
Mobile applications and mobile technologies intro-
duce new sets of requirements and constraints. For 
example, the degree of mobility that is expected 
within an application will impact on how it is 
designed (from a P2P perspective high mobility 
might suggest a more decentralised approach).  In 
addition, the technology capabilities of a mobile 
device can restrict memory availability (and thus 
program size), or the amount of processing the 
device can perform. Likewise mobile technology 
will introduce its own requirements such as battery 
life or those derived from restrictions imposed 
by the devices OS. Given the influence mobility 
can have on a systems design, it is important 
for developers to consider it at all stages of the 
development lifecycle and, where practical, for 
mobile technology decisions to be finalised as 
early as possible. 
Network and communication 
requirements and constraints
The carrier or network type, and the expected 
network coverage level can all have implications 
on a developed system. Of particular importance 
is the communication mechanism that will be 
used, with various tradeoffs that exist between 
bandwidth capabilities, range capabilities and 
power consumption characteristics. During de-
velopment designers will need to consider the 
characteristics/requirements of their system and 
how these relate to the functionality provided by 
the available technology. This will also influence 
other design decisions, for example the type of 
P2P topology that should be used.
P2P technology requirements and 
constraints
An important part of P2P software development 
is the definition and analysis of the underlying 
topology that is to be used. Our previous work 
(Walkerdine, 2002) has shown that the choice 
of topology can have a significant impact on the 
properties (e.g. security) of a system, perhaps most 
clearly highlighted with the differences between 
decentralised and semi-centralised architectures. 
It is important for designers to realise and under-
stand the effect that the choice of topology can 
have on a systems specification and design (and 
likewise how a system’s requirements can influ-
ence the choice of topology). For context, Figure 
1 presents a summary of the key classes of P2P 
topologies.
The choice of P2P technology (for example, 
the protocol and implementations used) can also 
have an influence, with each typically offering 
varying degrees of functionality to the devel-
oper. For example, JXTA provides considerably 
more P2P development support than .NET, and 
consequently less needs to be provided within 
any system design. Likewise, the distributed 
P2P security implementations that are provided 
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by (Berket et al., 2004) and (Agarwal et al., 2001), 
each offers differing levels of security support. 
Given this, it will be important for developers to 
commit to a technology at an early stage within 
the development lifecycle.
Adopting an Architectural Driven 
Design Approach
Due to the fact that architectures play a key 
role in P2P development, it is beneficial to use a 
design approach that places a greater emphasis 
on these issues. Architectural driven design ap-
proaches specifically encourage the development 
of the system architecture from early within the 
development lifecycle, and so represent an ideal 
option for supporting P2P system development. 
Such approaches also support the use of reference 
architectures that can act as inputs to the design 
process - helping developers determining the 
architectural building blocks they might need.
tHE PEPErs DEVELOPMENt 
MEtHODOLOGY
The PEPERS Development Methodology (PDM) 
was originally conceived in the BANKSEC proj-
ect (BANKSEC, 2000), in which a methodology 
was needed for specifying system and component 
security requirements. During P2P ARCHITECT 
(P2P ARCHITECT, 2001), this methodology was 
further developed and tailored for use in the speci-
fication and design of dependable P2P software 
systems. Within PEPERS it has been further re-
fined to support the development of secure mobile 
P2P applications. Within each project the meth-
odology has been used and evaluated by end user 
industrial partners. As a consequence, the PDM 
is a result of many years of practical industrial 
use and theoretical refinement (it has been suc-
cessfully applied in the development of banking 
and P2P based online booking systems).
Existing methodologies already exist for 
more general mobile application development 






























































(for example the UML based development ap-
proach described in (B’Far, 2004) and the work on 
network-based software architectures in (Fielding, 
2000)). Middleware solutions, such as PROEM 
(Kortuem, 2002) have also been developed to 
provide a foundation for the development of mo-
bile P2P systems. In addition there has also been 
work in developing more innovative methods, 
such as ontology-based development methods, 
e.g. Tropos (Bertolini, 2002; Mouratidis, 2003), 
to aid P2P system design. However, no general 
software engineering methodology exists that 
particularly encourages developers to consider 
security and P2P issues, and thus in this regard, 
the PDM is novel.
The PDM is based on a 5-stage spiral model 
as illustrated in Figure 2. This spiral model is 
comprised of five segments:
• Requirements Elicitation
• Propose P2P system architecture
• Propose sub-system design
• System Implementation
• Verification and Validation
The spiral nature of the PDM provides the 
advantage of a flexible development process in 
which designers are not rigidly constrained by 
fixed phases. An important characteristic of the 
method is that it is iterative, in that during the 
design of a P2P application the designers can 
revisit stages of the model as new requirements, 
architectural issues, etc, come to light. It is likely, 
for example, that early on in a P2P applications 
development, iterations of the model will largely 
focus on the gathering and defining of require-
ments, and later stages on sub-system design. 
This spiral and iterative nature of the process is 
important for accommodating the fact that a P2P 
system’s design will often change during develop-
ment. This may be as a result of a range of factors, 
including the resolution of requirement conflicts, 
the late identification of additional requirements, 
changes in the application domain or business 
context and so on.
The PDM is flexible enough to accommo-
date different types of software engineering 
techniques during development. For example, 
different requirement elicitation techniques, or 
design approaches.
A detailed breakdown of the PDM is provided 
later in this chapter. To help illustrate this and the 
use of the support tool a real-world case study is 
also presented. To provide some background, the 
chapter will first provide an overview of the case 
study and the supporting tool.
case study: supporting a 
security Firm
To help in the design and evaluation of the methods 
and tools developed within PEPERS, the project 
consortium includes industrial user partners 
who wish to use P2P technology to support their 
own business practices. One of these is a major 
international security firm who wishes to support 
their guards in communicating, collaborating 
and sharing information with each other whilst 
on patrol. Another is a media company who 
wishes to allow their journalists, photographers 
and editors to work together in the creation of 
magazines and newspaper articles. In both cases 
Figure 2. The stages that comprise the PDM
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the companies wish to use P2P to support secure 
communication and data exchange between their 
personnel, who may be geographically dispersed 
or particularly mobile, and may only have access 
to mobile devices. Within the project each user 
partner has built a secure mobile P2P system that 
specifically supports elements of their business 
processes. The PDM was used as the underlying 
methodology for the development of the applica-
tions in both cases.  
For this case study we will focus on the pilot 
that was developed with the security firm. Its 
aim was to allow its security guards and mobile 
patrols to receive and transmit sensitive customer 
information in a dynamic environment via their 
mobile devices. Such environments are typically 
ad-hoc exceptional situations which the guards/
patrols have responded to and which involves them 
co-operating with one another. Guards are initially 
assigned tasks via the ARC, a central computer 
based in the company’s headquarters.
The pilot was built for operation on a Sony 
Ericsson Symbian 9 OS phone, and has been 
successfully deployed and evaluated within the 
organisation for a period of 6 months. Figure 3 
provides a screenshot of the developed security 
pilot application running on the phone.
Using the application guards are able to receive 
tasks from the ARC, update it on their progress, 
as well as communicate messages and images 
directly with each other. All communication is 
encrypted, and repeated authentication is required 
to access the applications functionality. Dynamic 
verification techniques are also used to ensure 
that the user does not perform actions that are 
inappropriate for their role. 
tool support for the PDM
In order to support designers in using the PDM, 
web based tool support was also built. Designed 
to be generic in nature, it is able to work along-
side different system engineering paradigms 
(for example, architectural driven or component 
based design). Not only does the tool support the 
development of systems in accordance with the 
PDM, it also actively encourages the consideration 
of security issues by the developers. 
The tool itself can play a part during the first 
three stages of the method. It provides support 
for requirement gathering and analysis, as well 
as assisting the designers in making informed 
decisions with regards to the architectural design. 
Designers are able to draw upon a knowledge 
base of topologies and P2P application reference 
architectures, and the characteristics (i.e. the effect 
on system properties, etc). They are also able to 
identify and provide initial descriptions for the 
sub-systems within their design. The intention 
is that designers use separate tools (for example, 
Rational Rose) to then fully develop the system 
architecture and design.
The tool itself provides a number of key fea-
tures for designers:
• Support for identifying, specifying and 
managing requirements. The tool can assist 
developers in identifying and specifying 
system requirements during software de-
velopment. 
 
Figure 3. The Security firm pilot
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• Support for topology selection. The tool 
draws upon a knowledge base of P2P topolo-
gies and details about the impact they may 
have on a range of security and mobility 
properties. The tool is able to present this 
knowledge to the developers enabling them 
to make informed decisions, as well as being 
able to suggest suitable topologies.
• Support for the identification of key secure 
mobile P2P application functionality. The 
tool assists the designer in identifying key 
areas of desired application functionality 
(functional capabilities). This could be, for 
example, encryption or instant messenger 
capabilities. 
• Support for secure mobile P2P Application 
Reference Architecture selection. The tool 
is able to draw upon a knowledge base of 
application reference architectures and the 
capabilities they typically support. The tool 
can present this knowledge to the designers 
and suggest application reference architec-
tures that may be of relevance. 
• Support for Sub-system identification and 
initial description. The tool provides facili-
ties to allow designers to identify and provide 
initial descriptions for the sub-systems used 
within their design. These can be outputted 
and further developed within separate design 
packages. 
• Support for general managerial and trace 
ability activities. The tool provides a num-
ber of managerial features including report 
generation and traceability support, allowing 
designers to trace their various decisions 
throughout the design process. For example, 
by linking the choice of topology to the set 
of requirements that motivated this design 
decision. The output of the tool can also be 
imported into UML tools (via XMI).
brEAKDOWN OF tHE PDM
The chapter will now move on to describe the 
five stages of the PDM in detail. The case study 
will be visited at each stage to help illustrate the 
PDM in use. It should be noted that although the 
user partner performed many iterations of the 
PDM’s spiral before the design was complete; 
for the sake of brevity these are not all fully 
documented here.
requirements Elicitation
Before commencing this stage, a business deci-
sion to procure a P2P system to support some 
business activity must first have been made. From 
this decision, a number of business requirements 
will be generated. These business requirements 
set out the critical functionality that the P2P 
system is expected to provide and define the 
constraints on the operation of the system that is 
to be developed. 
From these high level goals, more concrete 
system requirements are generated and speci-
fied.  Part of this will involve the identification 
of security requirements many of which will be 
applicable to the P2P system as a whole rather 
than to the individual parts that comprise it. In 
summary, activities in this stage of development 
would include:
• Elicitation of business goals and require-
ments from stakeholders. The identification 
of mobile and security requirements should 
play a central role in the elicitation process. 
Part of this should involve a detailed security 
analysis, using techniques such as threat 
modelling to help identify the security risks 
and the (differing) levels of security that will 
exist within the system. Stakeholders should 
also be encouraged to identify the mobility 
attributes they desire for the system.
• Elicitation system requirements from stake-
holders and business requirements. Again 
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mobile and security aspects should be an 
important focus. 
• Analysis and negotiation of agreed system 
requirements. Negotiate any conflicts be-
tween stakeholder requirements. 
• Production of system requirements docu-
ment. 
The properties of the various P2P topologies 
and the effect that these can have on system 
requirements will play a significant part at this 
stage of development. For example, identified 
requirements may restrict the choice of topology 
(for example, a system that is to be highly managed 
would benefit most from a semi-centralised topol-
ogy). Conversely the selection of a topology may 
produce additional functional requirements for the 
system (for example, the need for super peers). In 
either case, there is likely to be conflicting issues 
between the requirements and the topologies that 
would need to be resolved.
case study
During the initial iterations of the model in 
this stage the user partner identified a number 
of business and security requirements for their 
P2P system (a small selection of which are as 
follows):
• Mechanisms should be in place to verify 
the identity of users when taking on specific 
roles within the system (e.g. ARC operator, 
Mobile Unit member, Team Leader etc)
• The system should manage data on a strict 
need-to-know basis
• It is essential that location, status, activity, 
assignment, incident and project data does 
not become available to unauthorised indi-
viduals
• The system should not require additional 
hardware expenditure of more than 5000 
euros
The user partner then proceeded to identify a 
set of initial viewpoints and system requirements 
for their P2P system, using the tool support to 
help document them. As the designers gained a 
clearer understanding of the different stakeholders 
needs, the system requirements were revised and 
specified in more detail. Identified viewpoints and 
requirements included: 
• Shift Supervisor: The person in change of 
assigning shifts, briefing and de-briefing 
guards
• Shift Creation: The system should allow 
the Shift Supervisor to create and describe 
shifts (including relevant security data)
• Guard Monitoring: The system should 
be able to log all the activities of a mobile 
unit (guard) including all communications, 
actions on data, changes in status and move-
ments in the real world
• Guard: The person who takes part in secu-
rity related activities 
• Information Request: The guard should be 
able to request information from the system 
that is required in order to complete their 
task. 
As the specification and design developed, 
the designers were able to use the support tool to 
begin identifying which security properties and 
system capabilities where relevant. In turn the tool 
was able to suggest topology and P2P application 
reference architectures that may be suitable for 
their design (as described below). 
Propose system Architecture
The architecture of any system is the framework 
that defines how the entities within it (e.g. com-
ponents, objects, etc) are organised and what 
relationships may exist between them.
Before developing the architecture it is usually 
necessary for at least some requirements to have 
been defined. However a complete set of require-
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ments will usually not be available in the very early 
stages of the development. Initial requirements 
can be used to generate preliminary ideas of the 
architectural design, and by defining architectures 
early on it can provide the designers with ways 
of organising the process of specification and 
design. From a secure mobile P2P perspective, 
however, it is important that initial security and 
mobility requirements have been identified and 
considered, before this stage is begun.
Furthermore, when developing mobile P2P 
systems it is highly likely that the specification and 
the design will be interwoven, with each affecting 
the other as system development proceeds. The 
utilisation of an iterative approach allows these 
two to be developed in concert with each other. 
The activities designers of mobile P2P sys-
tems would carry out in this development phase 
include:
• Select topologies. Based on the identified 
system requirements, and mobile and secu-
rity properties for the P2P system, designers 
can filter and select the appropriate topolo-
gies. Knowledge of the different topologies 
and their influence on system properties 
(Walkerdine, 2002; Walkerdine, 2006) can 
be used as an input into this activity. For 
example, semi-centralised topologies can 
assist in the provision of authentication 
and authorisation functionality. However, 
the centralised points they possess also act 
as points of weakness in the architecture – 
making them susceptible to attacks.
• Derive system functional capabilities. De-
signers should derive from the identified re-
quirements, system functional capabilities. 
These capabilities represent abstract system 
functionality that the system should possess. 
For example, it may be desired for the system 
to possess Instant Messaging capabilities, 
or encryption capabilities. The identification 
of these capabilities can help designers in 
selecting relevant secure mobile P2P ap-
plication reference architectures.
• Select mobile P2P application reference 
architectures. Designers can use the ca-
pabilities that have been identified in the 
previous activity to help select secure mo-
bile P2P application reference architectures 
that could be used as input into the design 
of their system. Within PEPERS a set of 
reference architectures have been developed 
that reflect key application domains within 
the field (e.g. shared workspace, distributed 
storage, etc) and the different types of P2P 
topology (Walkerdine, 2005). 
• Establish architectural model.  This is 
where an overall model of the system at a 
high level is developed; it shows the system 
entities and the relationships between them. 
Designers can draw upon the application 
reference architectures and their capabili-
ties to help them gain an understanding of 
what may be required, and also to provide 
references to compare their own designs 
against. Furthermore, the choice of topology 
and identified requirements will also have 
an effect on the architectural model (for ex-
ample, whether it is to be a decentralised or 
semi-centralised system). Identified security 
and mobility requirements will play a key 
role within this activity, impacting on the 
architectural model and vice versa - and so 
should be considered carefully.
• Describe sub-systems. Here the functionality 
of each sub-system is defined and attention 
is drawn to sub-system boundaries. Again 
the application reference architectures can be 
used to help the designers to initially think 
about the sub-systems, the services they 
provide and their boundaries. Likewise the 
identified requirements will be an important 
input to this activity.    
• Where possible, allocate requirements to 
sub-systems.  Requirements that have been 
identified and specified for the system 
should be mapped on to the architecture and 
its sub-systems. Ideally, each requirement 
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will be assigned to a single sub-system. In 
practice, however, this is rarely possible 
as a requirement may encompass several 
sub-systems (particularly with mobility and 
security requirements). 
• Evaluate architecture.  This involves check-
ing to ensure that all requirements have 
been assigned to sub-systems, looking for 
mismatches between the architecture and the 
requirements and assessing what problems 
may arise when implementing the architec-
ture. Assessing how well the security and 
mobile technology requirements have been 
satisfied will be particularly important.
Case Study
Having performed initial requirements elicitation 
activities, the designers began to investigate the 
suitability of the different topologies and ap-
plication reference architectures for use in their 
architectural design.
As shown in Figure 4, the designers used the 
supporting tool to assign ratings to a range of se-
curity properties (top diagram). For each property 
the developers indicated its importance to their 
design and to what requirements it related to. Based 
on this input the tool was able to suggest that a 





Figure 4. Rating the importance of security properties, and using these to suggest suitable topologies
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able for meeting their requirements. The bottom 
diagram shows the topology recommendations 
based on the desired security properties, with 
the most suitable at the top. In both diagrams, 
green represents high priority, orange for medium 
priority and red for low priority. 
Upon further analysis of the system require-
ments (in particular the fact that the existing 
system possesses a single centralised server - the 
ARC), a design decision was made to use a semi-
centralised topology as a basis for the system. Be-
cause the users existing system already possessed 
a central server, the choice of topology did not 
impose any additional requirements/constraints 
onto the design that had not already been consid-
ered. Figure 5 provides a general overview of the 
topology used within the system.
The designers also made use of the support 
tool in order to gain suggestions for secure mo-
bile P2P application reference architectures that 
could provide an input to their design. Although 
none of the reference architectures known by the 
tool were directly relevant to the system being 
developed, the Instant Messenger and Shared 
Workspace reference architectures were found 
to be the closest fit.
At this time the designers also began to develop 
the architectural model for their system. The to-
pology was the foundation of the system design, 
and this was extended so that the structure of the 
different peer types (standard or super peers) that 
comprised it, were then specified. As part of this 
process, the designers drew upon the reference 
architectures, and the requirements document. 
From studying the reference architectures the 
designers identified the key sub-systems they 
would require in their architectural design. Not 
all of the sub-systems described within the refer-
ence architectures were used, with the designers 
feeling that the functionality relating to real-time 
connection monitoring and logging was unneces-
sary in their pilot. Likewise the designers decided 
that limited awareness functionality would be 
incorporated within the P2P Communication sub-
system, rather than as a standalone sub-system as 

















Figure 5. General overview of the topology used within the developed system
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the support tool, the designers began to briefly 
describe the sub-systems they had identified for 
their system. Figure 6 provides a screenshot of 
the tool showing topology and reference architec-
ture choices, and the sub-systems that have been 
identified. Using a separate design tool, these 
sub-systems were then organised into high-level 
architectures for the peer (Figure 7), before being 
developed into a full design. 
Propose sub-system Design
This stage focuses on the actual design of the P2P 
system; taking the proposed system architecture 
 
Figure 6. Reviewing choices and identifying sub-systems
Network NativeApplications Camera














Figure 7. High level architecture for a standard peer
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and requirements specification, and using these 
to create a detailed design for the system. To do 
this an initial architecture for the system must 
have been developed. 
The activities the designers would carry out 
in this stage include:
• Specifying the entities that make up the 
system architecture and its subsystems 
(objects, components, etc)
• Specifying the relationships that may exist 
between these entities. 
• Specifying the allocation of system require-
ments to these entities. 
• Specify, if necessary, the non-functional 
attributes that an entity should have
As part of PEPERS a set of runtime modules 
have been developed that provide general function-
ality (for example, encryption, secure P2P com-
munication, etc) intended for use by mobile P2P 
applications (Walkerdine, 2007). When designing 
the various application sub-systems, developers 
may wish to make use of these modules. The tool 
support has knowledge of such modules and can 
direct the developer towards using them during 
the design process. 
Initial implementation choices will also impact 
on the design stage. Because a single develop-
ment standard does not exist for P2P systems, a 
design can change significantly depending on the 
underlying technology that is to be used. Likewise 
the choice of mobile technology will also have 
repercussions on the system design. To support 
the design process, initial implementation choices 
should be made early, with the PDM’s design and 
implementation stages re-visited as the develop-
ment progresses. 
Case Study
By the time the user partner focused their efforts 
on this stage, the requirements and application 
architecture had been through a number of itera-
tions of development and some initial decisions 
had been made with regards to implementation 
technology. The design progressed with reference 
to the Shared Workspace reference architecture 
suggested by the support tool. The designers 
proceeded to specify the design of the various 
sub-systems in detail, using a separate design 
tool (Rational Rose). For those they intended to 
develop themselves, this involved breaking them 
down into components, which were then further 
expanded with class definitions. The individual 
classes were then specified, with attributes and 
methods defined. 
The designers decided that, where possible, 
the sub-systems would be based around those 
provided by the PEPERS runtime modules. In 
particular their design would draw upon P2P Com-
munications, Authentication/Authorisation and 
Encryption modules. The designers integrated the 
interfaces for these modules into their design. 
The design was also influenced by the imple-
mentation technology decisions that had been 
made. In particular it was decided that a Sony 
Ericsson phone would be used and the applica-
tion would be developed in Java. This in turn 
introduced requirements that fed back into the 
requirements elicitation and placed limitations 
on the architecture/design stages.
system Implementation
This stage takes the requirements, high-level ar-
chitecture and detailed design from the previous 
stages and uses them to guide the actual construc-
tion of the final system. Initial iterations of this 
stage will typically focus on determining the types 
of technology that would be used as part of the 
implementation. The PDM does not prescribe set 
implementation approaches and instead allows 
developers and organisations to use the processes 
they are already familiar with.
The activities developers would carry out in 
this stage include: 
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• Decide on P2P technologies. For example, 
the P2P protocol and API
• Decide on mobile technologies. For example, 
the mobile device and communication tech-
nologies. 
• Decide on security technologies. For ex-
ample, encryption algorithms and related 
API’s.
• Implement system entities. Using PEPERS 
runtime module implementations if appli-
cable. 
• Integrate system entities. 
Designers should carefully consider the impact 
technology choices will have on their develop-
ment (in terms of requirements/constraints). In 
many cases legacy technologies will also play a 
role within the system, especially if the system is 
to integrate with a clients existing setup (which 
typically will be more centralised and less mobile). 
Certainly during early stages of the development 
it will be important to re-visit the previous stages 
of the PDM, until the technical impact on the 
design has been fully considered.  
Case Study
During early iterations of the development model, 
the user partners began to make decisions on 
how their system was to be implemented. It 
was decided that, where possible, the PEPERS 
runtime modules would be utilised and that the 
rest of the system would be built using Java. As 
a result of this decision, the bulk of the security 
functionality would be provided by the PEPERS 
modules. Additionally it was decided that a Sony 
Ericsson/Symbian 9 OS phone would be used 
as the basis of the mobile system hardware. The 
overall system would also need to integrate with 
the existing centralised system that formed the 
basis of the ARC central computer.
In later iterations, the focus moved to proto-
typing and implementing the sub-system designs 
developed during the previous stages. A key part 
of this was the integration of the PEPERS runtime 
modules with the rest of the components that had 
been developed in-house.
Verification and Validation
This stage focuses on the verification and valida-
tion of the system development and will occur 
at various points of the development lifecycle as 
the requirements, design and implementation are 
refined. Verification involves checking the system 
conforms to its specification. Validation involves 
checking the system as implemented meets the 
expectations of the client.
The activities carried out in this stage in-
clude:
• Validate the requirements against the stake-
holders. 
• Validate the architecture against the re-
quirements. The architecture/requirements 
mapping performed in the Propose System 
Architecture stage will support this activ-
ity.  
• Validate the sub-system design against the 
architecture and requirements. The require-
ment/ sub-system mapping performed as 
part of the Sub-system Design stage will 
support this activity. 
• Validate the implementation against the 
requirements/design. Validating the imple-
mentation using testing techniques. 
• Verify the design models against the require-
ments. Design models representing abstract 
system behaviour are verified against the 
requirements. Within PEPERS this activ-
ity is supported by the Static Verification 
Framework (SVF) (Siveroni, 2008).
• Verify the implementation against the re-
quirements. The runtime execution of the 
system is verified against the requirements. 
Within PEPERS this activity is supported 
by the Dynamic Verification Framework 
(DVF) (Spanoudakis, 2008).
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As a consequence of these activities, further 
iterations of the development model may be re-
quired so that additional requirements elicitation 
and negotiation, architecture and design refine-
ment can be performed. As the PEPERS runtime 
platform modules have already been through a 
process of verification and validation, there use 
within a development can further help to support 
this process and help reduce the resources required 
for this stage. 
Case Study
This stage was frequently visited during the 
development lifecycle. Initially the focus was on 
validating the identified business, security and 
system requirements with the clients. This was 
achieved through the use of sets of documented 
requirements (which were signed off by the user 
partners) as well as face to face requirement 
checking and negotiation workshops.
In later iterations of the methodology, valida-
tion moved on to focus on the architecture and 
sub-system design. During this phase of develop-
ment, the user partners constructed semi-formal 
behavioural models of the system. These were 
then checked verified automatically using the SVF 
toolkit (Siveroni, 2008) to ensure the correct and 
expected operation of the system. 
Finally the implementation was tested and 
debugged; drawing upon the DVF at runtime to 
make sure that incorrect usage behaviour was 
being blocked/reported.
EXPErIENcEs IN UsING tHE PDM
As mentioned previously, industrial partners 
utilised the PDM to assist in the development 
of their pilot applications. This not only allowed 
the method and tool to be evaluated but also al-
lowed refinements to be made based on feedback 
from industrial partner experiences. In addition, 
workshops were held with local mobile phone soft-
ware companies to obtain additional third-party 
feedback. These companies were typically small 
in size, and so provided a different perspective to 
the software development process.
Overall the developers found the PDM and 
supporting tool to offer significant help in guiding 
the development of their secure mobile P2P ap-
plications. The smaller industrial companies were 
less sure about its use to them, mainly because 
they do not have the resources to follow a tradi-
tional development process and time to market 
is critical to them. They tended to use ‘extreme 
programming’ approaches to mobile software 
development. The larger companies, on the other 
hand, used more comprehensive development 
approaches and found the PDM to be of more 
relevance. This also highlights how the use of 
software engineering techniques within the real 
world is very much dependent on an organisations 
situation and its available resources. 
 The current development approaches they used 
were particularly linear in fashion (modelled on 
the ‘waterfall model’) and although it took time 
to get used to, they found the iterative nature of 
the PDM to benefit their way of working. The 
developers also found that the methodology and 
tool support was flexible enough to allow them 
to use existing processes and tools (such as their 
current UML design tools).
The developers found that the method encour-
aged them to consider specific security, mobile 
technology and P2P issues early within their 
systems development - something which their 
existing approaches did not achieve. Designers 
found the recommended secure mobile applica-
tion reference architectures useful and that they 
were able to contribute to the development of a 
suitable architecture for their application. 
However, despite these positive outcomes, due 
in part to the lack of experience with the method 
and the criticality of the application development, 
a number of issues were identified where it was 
felt the PDM could be improved.
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Understanding the PDM
Many of the developers found the PDM to be sig-
nificantly different from their current approaches 
to software development. As a result it took them 
a while to learn and gain an understanding of the 
steps that are involved. In particular the spiral, 
iterative approach was novel to them and it meant 
that their management style had to adapt to ac-
commodate it. Given their inexperience with 
the method, there were times when this caused 
problems, resulting in detailed design decisions 
being made too early. When this occurred it 
became necessary for the designers to step back 
and re-assess their development. As the develop-
ers became more familiar with the methodology, 
however, such issues occurred less often. Given 
that all software development approaches take 
time to learn and understand, such findings are 
not that surprising.
Difficulty in Selecting Suitable 
Mobile P2P Application reference 
Architectures
The developers initially found it difficult to 
identify which mobile P2P application reference 
architectures would be able to assist them in their 
design. The reference architectures themselves 
tackle specific types of application functionality, 
when in reality an actual system development may 
involve a combination of these functionalities. 
Initially the industrial partners tried to identify 
a single reference architecture that would satisfy 
all their requirements. It was only when they 
realised that this could not be achieved that they 
started to understand the true utility of these ar-
chitectures; as points of reference for their own 
design. Supporting documentation that clarifies 
the use and benefit of reference architectures would 
encourage designers to make more appropriate 
use of them. 
the concept of capabilities within 
the reference Architectures
The developers had some difficulty in initially 
understanding the notion of a “capability” as 
used within the methodology and supporting 
tool. In particular their lack of experience of the 
P2P domain meant that they found it difficult 
to identify which capabilities would be relevant 
to their design. Such difficulties diminished as 
their experience grew, however it highlights the 
importance of novice P2P developers gaining 
a good understanding of the domain prior to 
development.
Improved recommendation support
Developers felt that that security property analysis 
provided by the tool could be made finer grained. 
Some of the security properties could be further 
broken down into sub-characteristics, reflecting 
the fact that developers may desire for a property 
to be provided for in different ways. For example, 
a systems attack resistance can be represented in 
different ways (lack of central points of failure, 
ability to resist tampering, etc). In addition, de-
velopers commented that the tool should provide 
a more detailed rationale behind its recommen-
dations, further helping them to make their final 
architectural choices.
the consideration of Other 
Non-Functional Properties
Although PEPERS has predominantly focused 
on mobility, security and P2P, the developers 
pointed out that for the PDM to be accepted as a 
development methodology it would also need to 
consider other non-functional properties such as 
reliability, scalability, etc. Although beyond the 
scope of the PEPERS project, expanding the PDM 
to consider such properties (or at least allowing it 
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to draw upon suitable related work from areas such 
as dependability) is an area of future work.
cONcLUsION
There is an increasing interest in building mobile 
P2P applications. However for mobile P2P to be 
utilised within such an environment it also needs 
to be secure and the nature of P2P can make this 
difficult. A key problem is that the choice of P2P 
technologies can influence the properties of a 
systems design, and so consequently existing 
methodologies need to be extended or new ones 
developed in order to take this into account. 
This chapter has presented the PEPERS Devel-
opment Methodology, a method designed to assist 
in the development of secure mobile P2P systems. 
It adopts an architectural driven development 
approach and encourages developers to consider 
issues related to security, mobility and P2P from 
early within the development cycle.
The PDM was developed as part of the PEP-
ERS project, one aspect of which involved its use 
within the development of real industrial P2P 
systems. To help in describing the PDM we have 
used one of these as a case study.
Experiences with using the PDM have shown 
that it can be a valuable aid in developing secure 
mobile P2P systems. In particular developers 
found that it made them more aware of archi-
tectural design issues and it encouraged them 
to think and consider them early on within their 
developments. There are a few areas where it 
could still be further refined. In particular the 
developers found the approach to be quite dif-
ferent from the more linear methods that they 
currently used, and the provision of clearer steps 
and more detailed examples would have helped 
in the quicker understanding of the method. The 
PDM also needs to consider other non-functional 
properties to widen its applicability.
Because we believe that tool support can play 
a crucial role within the development process, a 
tool has also been built that assists the designers in 
using the PDM. This tool has also been discussed 
and demonstrated within the chapter. 
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